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ONE FOR TEN DOLLARS, TWO FOR THIRTY: THE
VALUE OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM DWELLING POLICY FOR THE
INSURED
Matthew J. Kutner*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Attaching "national" to flood insurance is a strange concept, if one
really thinks about it. Insurance protection against flood damage is quite
a different beast on coastal Long Island, New York, and Florida, than,
say, an area within a desert climate in the southwest United States. Yet,
geography does not play a role in the standard flood policy's terms and
conditions. A one-size-fits-all national program is what we have. Ninety
percent of all natural disasters in the United States are flood-related,'
and, for over forty years, the federal government has been intimately
involved in the provision of flood insurance2 since the creation of the
National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP").
The insurance industry, in general, achieves profitability by taking
in more money from policy premium payments than it pays out for
claims from covered damages. The actuarial risk of having to pay claims
determines, in part, what premium the insured is charged. This is also a
strange concept for the federal government-we call its antithesis
* In addition to being a 2009 graduate of Hofstra University School of Law and a former
Research Editor for the Hofstra Law Review, I am currently a Staff Attorney with the New York
Legal Assistance Group's ("NYLAG") Storm Response Unit, where I assist and represent clients, at
no cost, with legal issues that arose as a result of Superstorm Sandy. Thank you to Ann Dibble,
Sunny Noh, Sam Wachtel, Liz Glazer, Hon. Gary Knobel, and the Staff and Editors of the Hofstra
Law Review for their assistance and contributions. A special thank you to Gariel, whom I first met
over seven years ago when she was my Notes and Comments Editor and I was a Staff Member on
the Hofstra Law Review. Her contributions are immeasurable. The opinions in this Idea do not
represent those of NYLAG.
1. Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National FloodInsurance Program
and the "Takings" Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 325 (1990).
2. The NFIP is qodified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2006), and is implemented through the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's ("FEMA") regulations at 44 C.F.R. §§ 59-79 (2013).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:169

"deficit spending," and this is current federal fiscal policy. Without
being able to spend more than it receives, the federal government could
not operate. Like the federal government, the NFIP is not profitable.4
It is because of the lack of profitability of the flood insurance
market that the federal government occupied the void left behind by
fleeing private flood insurers. 5 However, government involvement in the
insurance business is not for reasons of profitability, but for reasons of
public policy. 6 The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012
("Biggert-Waters") 7 aimed to change this. Whereas NFIP policy
premiums are set by federal law and, in large part, are subsidized,
Biggert-Waters amended that policy to bring premium costs more in-line
with the actual risk of flood damage using actuarial rates. 8 Both
conservative free-market groups and traditionally progressive
environmental groups supported Biggert-Waters with enthusiasm; 9 the
typical "customer" probably never heard of it. Although Biggert-Waters
was recently amended by the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability
Act of 2014,10 NFIP premium increases are imminent. While paying
more for something, by itself, is not necessarily a bad thing, paying more
for the same, inadequate thing is; free-marketers and environmentalists
would probably agree with that, too.

II. BEDFELLOWS
For New Yorkers impacted by Superstorm Sandy ("Sandy") in late
October 2012 and Hurricane Irene ("Irene") in the summer of 2011,
flood insurance coverage is an intimate topic. I experienced the NFEP
beginning shortly after Sandy as a Staff Attorney in the New York Legal
Assistance Group's Storm Response Unit ("SRU"), where I, and
approximately thirty other attorneys and advocates within SRU,
currently assist and represent clients with Sandy-related legal issues and

3.

See

Doug

Bandow,

Budget Reform

in Reverse:

Congress Prepares to

Hike

Flood Insurance Subsidies, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/dougbandow/2014/02/24/budget-reform-in-reverse-congress-prepares-to-hike-flood-insurancesubsidies/2.
4. See id
5. § 4001(b).
6.

Christine M. McMillan, Comment, Federal Flood Insurance Policy. Making Matters

Worse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 486 (2007).
7.

Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 916 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4130

(2012)).
8. See 126 Stat. at 921.
9. Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: Smartersafer.organd the Biggert-Waters Act of 2012, 23
DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 351,353-54(2013).

10.

Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, H.R. 3370, 113th Cong. (2014).
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disputes, at no cost, in all five boroughs of New York City and Long
Island. When the second "flood" arrived after Sandy-clients with
questions, and, later, disputes with their flood insurance carriers-we
quickly learned of the NFIP's limitations.
One would think that a flood insurance policy written and regulated
by federal law would be friendly to homeowners given the public policy
and not-for-profit motivations of the federal government. But this would
be wrong. One would also think that, under such a government program,
if property was lost or damaged because of a flood, no matter to what or
where, flood insurance would pay for the repair or replacement. Wrong
again. In fact, the flood policy explicitly excludes coverage for some of
the most costly damages." If two identical homes, with identical damage
and flood coverage filed identical claims for damage, they should get the
same amount of money for repairs or replacement, right? Not
necessarily. In part, this is because of another quirk of the NFIP-most
policies are purchased from Write Your Own ("WYO")
carriers, and the
12
policies are backed by the federal government.
WYO carriers, such as State Farm, Allstate, Travelers, and a host of
other commonly known insurance companies, administer the NFIP by
utilizing the services of the independent adjusting community.' 3 In
exchange for the retention of a portion of the premium to cover costs,
WYO carriers sell flood policies, and the remaining premium balance is
then forwarded to the federal government. 14 For example, despite a
homeowner having purchased a flood policy from Allstate, it is really
the federal government that retains the financial risk of insuring the
home. 5 It is also, ultimately, the obligation of the federal government to
pay the claim. 16 Allstate, for example, using the independent adjusting
community, may be the entity responsible for adjusting, assessing, and
processing claims, but the end-payor is the federal government. Allstate
and State Farm, for example, using their own respective independent
adjusting communities, may pay different settlements for identical
claims-adjustors, like lawyers, differ as to opinions on interpretation
and causation.
11.

See 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 app. A(1) (2013).

12.

FED.

EMERGENCY

MGMT.

AGENCY,

NATIONAL

FLOOD

INSURANCE

PROGRAM

ADJUSTER CLAIMS MANUAL, at 1-1 (2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydataI77c3a96a9c5e2e4b5Obc9el f958c5c48/adjclaimsmanualpartl _508rev-l2sepl 3.pdf
("The
WYO Program now accounts for approximately 90 percent of all flood policies."); McMillan, supra
note 6, at 489.
13. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 12, at 11-1.
14. McMillan, supra note 6, at 489; see also 44 C.F.R. §§ 62.23-.24.
15. 44 C.F.R. pt. 62 app. A (2013).
16. Id.
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NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM POLICY SPECIFICS

There are two main types of coverage that a standard NFIP
Dwelling 17 Form ("Policy") offers: (1) coverage for the structure of the
property of up to $250,000; and (2) coverage for contents or personal
property of up to $100,000.18 The Policy pays for direct physical damage

to the insured property, as a result of a "flood," 1 9 up to the replacement
20
cost or actual cash value of the actual damages of the Policy.
In addition to exclusions caused by carve-outs within specific
coverage provisions and narrowly defined terms, the Policy explicitly
lays out exclusions. 21 The Policy excludes a common, costly occurrence:
"earth movement even if the earth movement is caused by flood., 22 In
other words, if a tidal surge (a flood) washed away the "earth" that
encased a home's foundation, causing the foundation and the home to
destabilize, shift, or crack, despite sustaining potentially hundreds of
thousands of dollars in damages, the insured, under the Policy, could be
paid nothing for this damage. To be clear, the Policy excludes additional
types of occurrences and property from coverage that a reasonable
homeowner would assume to be covered under a "flood" insurance
policy, and this is but one example. I have little doubt that these
exclusions are policy determinations by NFIP administrators to save
money-odd, given the federal government's public policy motivations.
As a result of the apparent flood insurance public policy to make
homeowners whole as infrequently as possible, homeowners are left
with large funding gaps for repairs, rebuilding, and recovery, and few
options to rely upon to fill that gap. After Sandy, and, in no small part
because of New York Governor Andrew Cuomo (a former
United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")),
the federal government made billions of dollars available to

17. "Dwelling," under the Policy, is defined as: "A building designed for use as a residence
for no more than four families or a single-family unit in a building under a condominium form of
ownership." 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 app. A(1) (2013).

18.

Id.

19. "Flood," under the policy, is defined to mean:
1. A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of two or more
acres of normally dry land area ... from: a. Overflow of inland or tidal waters, b.
Unusual and rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any source, c.
Mudflow. 2. Collapse or subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or similar body of
water as a result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of water
exceeding anticipated cyclical levels that result in a flood as defined in A. L.a. above.

Id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Development Block Grant Disaster
New York through Community
23
Recovery ("CDBG-DR").
With these funds, two programs for disaster recovery assistance
arose: Build It Back ("BIB"), the program specifically for Sandy victims
in New York City; and NY Rising, the program for Sandy victims in
every Sandy-impacted area other than New York City, 24 including Long
Island. Like many programs funded by federal taxpayer dollars, the
federal government released the CDBG-DR funds with a host of
restrictions and regulations, which must be followed.2 5 Some of these
restrictions are beneficial, while others are onerous. Operating according
to these rules, it becomes the responsibility of the receiving municipality
(New York State and New York City) to design, create, and implement
these programs-which is no small task.26 Bear in mind, however, that
like the NFIP, these funds draw from the very same account from which
NFIP claims pay, the U.S. Treasury. As we will see, a homeowner that
filed a claim for flood damages under their NFIP policy, but received
nothing because of the Policy's "earth movement" exclusion,27 could be
eligible to receive the full amount of money necessary for repairs under
programs funded by CDBG-DR funds.2 8
IV.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT DISASTER RECOVERY

FUNDS
In this Part, I will focus on the NY Rising program's development
and some of its policy determinations for spending CDBG-DR funds.2 9
On January 29, 2013, Congress made $16 billion of CDBG-DR
funds available to states, including New York, to cover damages caused,
in part, by Sandy. 30 As a CDBG-DR grantee, New York was required to
23. See generally Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4
(Jan. 29, 2013).
24. Note, however, that BIB applicants may also have the option to sell their Sandy-damaged
properties to the state. Interested applicants are transferred from BIB to NY Rising. See Acquisition
for Redevelopment Program, N.Y.C. RECOVERY, http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/html/
homeowners/acquisition-for-redevelopment.shtml (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
25. Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,329-48 (effective Mar.
11, 2013) [hereinafter Requirements for Grantees Receiving CDBG].
26. Id. at 14,330.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
28. See infra text accompanying note 35.
29. For more information on BIB, see the BIB website, which contains excellent resources
and publications that explain the program and eligibility criteria. See Welcome to NYC Recovery,

NY RISING, http://www.nyc.gov/recovery (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
30. See generally Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4
(Jan. 29, 2013). CDBG funds are available to distressed areas resulting from a major disaster
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submit an action plan that described its proposed use of funds, and it
released its initial action plan on March 12, 2013.31 HUD approved New
York's plan on April 25, 2013, and, since then, New York published six
subsequent amendments.3 2 In total, $3,810,960,000 is available to New
York, excluding New York City, for disaster recovery and victims'
unmet needs. 33 More money may be on the way. Yet, CDBG-DR funds
come from the same payor as the NFIP-the federal government.
NY Rising is spending these funds for the provision of assistance to
Sandy victims, among other storm victims, for: repairs; reimbursement;
elevation; "optional resiliency" measures; and interim mortgage
assistance.34 To receive assistance, however, victims must establish their
eligibility under the program. In addition to other eligibility criteria, such
as a primary residency at the time of damage requirement, homeowners
who reside in certain flood-prone areas and who receive financial
assistance from NY Rising must, under federal law, obtain flood
insurance under the NFIP.3 Moreover, and also according to federal
law, "anyone that previously received Federal assistance following a
disaster and was required to get flood insurance, but did not, is ineligible
for CDBG-DR assistance. 3 6 This requirement has serious implications.

declared pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2012). See also Requirements for Grantees Receiving CDBG, supra note
25.
31. See generally N.Y. STATE HOMES AND CMTY. RENEWAL, STATE OF NEW YORK ACTION
PLAN FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM DISASTER RECOVERY (2013),

available at http://www.ny.gov/assets/documents/CDBGActionPlan.pdf.
32. Action Plan and Amendments, N.Y. STORM RECOVERY RESOURCES CTR.,
http://stormrecovery.ny.gov/action-plans-and-amendments (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
33. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF STORM RECOVERY, STATE OF NEW YORK ACTION PLAN
AMENDMENT NUMBER 6 TO THE ACTION PLAN FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT

DISASTER RECOVERY 2 (2014), available at http://www.stormrecovery.ny.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/secondallocationapafinalclean_20140220v3.pdf.
34.

NY
RISING
HOUSING
RECOVERY
PROGRAM,
HOMEOWNER
GUIDEBOOK
(2014),
available
at
http://stormrecovery.ny.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
homeownerguidebook 040814.pdf.
35. Id. at 5-6; see also 42 U.S.C. § 5154a(a) (2006). The statute states:
[N]o Federal disaster relief assistance made available in a flood disaster area may be
used to make a payment (including any loan assistance payment) to a person for repair,
replacement, or restoration for damage to any personal, residential, or commercial
property if that person at any time has received flood disaster assistance that was
conditional on the person first having obtained flood insurance under applicable Federal
law and subsequently having failed to obtain and maintain flood insurance as required
under applicable Federal law on such property.
2-4

§ 5154a(a).
36. NY RISING HOUSING RECOVERY PROGRAM, supra note 34, at 6 (emphasis added); see
also § 5154a(a).
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Consider the following common scenario: a Long Island
homeowner, with no mortgage, lives in a neighborhood that had never
flooded before. The homeowner is no longer working, and lives on a
modest, fixed income. Purchasing flood insurance coverage, according
to the homeowner, was an expenditure deemed unnecessary. In the
summer of 2011, however, Irene caused flood damage to the home.
Like many disaster victims, the homeowner seeks assistance from
the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"), and is granted
$1000 for home repair assistance. Under federal law, the homeowner is
now required to purchase flood insurance as a result of receipt of this
assistance. But, when the homeowner contacts her insurance broker, the
homeowner is quoted a price for the premium of an NFIP policy that the
homeowner could not afford. Accordingly, the homeowner chooses not
to purchase an NFIP policy after Irene.
Fast-forward to October 2012, and the arrival of Sandy. This time, a
tremendous amount of flood damage is caused to that same home.
Again, the homeowner applies for assistance from FEMA. However,
because the homeowner did not purchase an NFIP policy despite
receiving a FEMA grant after Irene, the homeowner will receive nothing
from FEMA, and, in addition, will not be eligible for assistance under
CDBG-DR funded programs like NY Rising.37
By contrast, for homeowners who had no flood insurance coverage
in place at the time of Sandy, but were not required to because they
never received any federal assistance prior to Sandy, FEMA benefits and
CDGB-DR funded programs, like NY Rising, are available. Let us
consider the example of the homeowner who had no flood insurance in
place at the time of Sandy, but suffers "earth movement" flood damage.
NY Rising assists this homeowner with Sandy-related repairs. The
homeowner, under NY Rising's guidelines and federal law, is now
required to purchase flood insurance to mitigate against future storms.38
This homeowner did purchase an NFIP policy. However, as previously
discussed, earth movement is excluded from coverage under the NFIP.39
If damage resulting from earth movement occurs in a future storm, the
homeowner, who will have paid timely and repeatedly for "flood"
coverage, will likely receive nothing from damage claims submitted
under the NFIP policy. The homeowner has paid, in this scenario, for the
false belief of insurance, and federal policy essentially forces
homeowners to purchase an NFIP policy and buy-in to that program.

37. Requirements for Grantees Receiving CDBG, supra note 25, at 14,344-45.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
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But for CDBG-DR money, and programs like NY Rising and BIB,
homeowners impacted by Sandy would have been left to fend for
themselves to fill significant unmet needs and funding gaps due to, in
large part, NFIP limitations. Unless the federal government envisions
funding CDBG-DR programs following every natural disaster and
flooding event, there will continue to be unmet financial needs because
of NFIP shortcomings.
Moreover, eventually, homeowners will be expected to pay more
for that false sense of security. In this scenario, which could apply to
many homeowners, flood insurance under the NFIP, absent more
homeowner-friendly revisions to the Policy, is a pecuniary charge
imposed upon a homeowner to yield public revenue, or, in other words,
a tax.4 °
V.

CONCLUSION

For better or worse, flood insurance under the NFIP is often the
frontline, financial first responder for disaster recovery in flood-prone
areas. The current model requires that, at some point, some portion of
the financial burden of protection shifts to the homeowner. There is
nothing controversial about requiring homeowners to bear some of that
cost. However, to charge homeowners more for the same, deficient thing
is unjust. If financing the NFIP is moving more towards the direction of
applying market principles, then a market should be created.
The only real, material choice homeowners have in deciding what
flood coverage to have in place is the dollar amount of coverage"should I have $50,000 worth of coverage, or $250,000?" Instead,
why not offer homeowners the opportunity to choose from
multiple types of policies at varying costs, or negotiate more propertyappropriate policies, rather than imposing upon them the current onesize-fits-all Policy?
The practical reality of the current model short-changes
homeowners from recovering money under policies that they thought
would fully protect their homes in the event of flood damage. This could
be for a multitude of reasons, not least of which is the current form of
the Policy. When recovery under the NFIP, administered by WYO
carriers, has been exhausted, or when homeowners, who faced repeated
delay and inaction understandably give up, the funding gap or unmet

40.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (9th ed. 2009). A "tax" is defined as: "A [monetary]

charge.., imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to yield public
revenue." Id.
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41
need is filled by CDBG-DR, state- and city-administered programs.
CDGB-DR funds are supplied by the same source as the NFIP-the U.S.
Treasury. While it remains to be seen how effective programs like NY
Rising will be, why not get it right the first time? Why not provide
homeowners, who have paid costly flood insurance premiums, and will
be expected to pay more, with a competent, comprehensive, and fair
NFIP? Not only would this accelerate disaster recovery, it would be the
right thing to do.

41.

See supra Part III.
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